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ABSTRACT 
Immanuel Kant claims that moral laws must hold for all rational beings universally and 
necessarily. In this thesis I first investigate Kant’s arguments against moral systems that are 
based on empirical information which can be found throughout his moral corpus. Then, I show 
that in Kant’s own moral system what moral laws there are is partially determined by empirical 
information and that this result presents a problem for the necessity and universality of morality. 
Further, I argue that contrary to what one might expect, Kant’s criticisms of an empirical 
foundation for morality do not resolve this issue and that it is unclear how Kant would respond to 
my critique.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In the Preface to his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant states 
that “everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e. as the ground of an obligation, 
must carry with it absolute necessity (4:389).1 Thus from the beginning of his first major ethical 
work, Kant has highlighted a key attribute which he thinks moral laws must have, necessity. In 
this thesis I will investigate what Kant thinks morality must be like and whether he was 
successful in establishing a moral system that meets his own criteria. I will argue that Kant 
thinks moral laws must be universal and necessary.2 However, I will show that in his moral 
system what moral laws there are is partially determined by empirical information and that this 
result presents a problem for meeting his criteria of universality and necessity. Further, I argue 
that his main criticism of an empirical foundation for morality does not resolve this issue and that 
it is unclear how Kant would respond.  
 
2 AGAINST AN EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION FOR MORALITY 
Before explaining Kant’s main argument against an empirical foundation for morality, it 
is important to clarify what it means for something to be empirical or a priori for Kant. He 
presents definitions and explanations for these terms in the introduction to the Critique of Pure 
Reason (CPR). Kant explains these concepts in terms of empirical and a priori cognitions. 
Empirical cognitions are those that “have their sources a posteriori, namely in experience” (B2). 
A priori cognitions, on the other hand, are “those that occur absolutely independently of all 
 
1 All citations to Kant’s works give the volume and page numbers of the Akademie edition, except for citations to 
the Critique of Pure Reason, which give page numbers from the second (B) edition. All quotations are from the 
English translations in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, the relevant works of which are 
individually cited below (see References).  
2 Both higher-order moral laws, like the supreme principle of morality, and lower-order moral laws, like the law 
against lying, are included here.  
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experience” (B2-3). So if we can only come to cognize something through experience, such as 
the fact that when I throw a ball in the air it will fall back down to the ground, knowledge of that 
thing is empirical. Whereas, if we can come to cognize something without reference to 
experience at all, such as mathematical postulates, knowledge of that thing is a priori.   
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important distinguishing factor that Kant 
identifies between empirical and a priori cognitions is that empirical cognitions can never be 
universal or necessary, whereas a priori cognitions are universal and necessary. He says 
Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative 
universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet 
perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict 
universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is 
not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori… Necessity and strict 
universality are therefore secure indications of an a priori cognition, and also belong 
together inseparably. (B4)  
 
Because Kant thinks that the things which happen in experience are contingent, any knowledge 
that is dependent on empirical information, information about what happens in experience, is 
also contingent. Such knowledge can be highly reliable, even to the point of never having any 
counterexamples, but it is still not strictly universal and necessary. Only knowledge which does 
not depend on experience, a priori knowledge, can be universal and necessary, and all a priori 
knowledge is universal and necessary. If we encounter some cognition that is not universal and 
necessary, then it is not an a priori cognition. Rather, it is an empirical cognition.3  
Now that we understand what Kant means by empirical and a priori we can better 
investigate his qualms with an empirical foundation for morality. Any moral system which 
ultimately grounds its investigation of what morality consists in in empirical information, 
 
3 While it is not important for the purposes of my thesis, Kant complicates the distinction between empirical and a 
priori cognitions by allowing for impure a priori cognitions. The highest concepts of morality, as it turns out, are 
examples of impure a priori cognitions. They concern empirical concepts while not being empirical themselves 
(B28-29). I will not be investigating their position as a priori cognitions in this thesis.  
3 
information from experience (e.g. the natural world), has an empirical foundation for morality. 
David Hume’s moral theory in which he argues that we make moral judgements based on our 
sentiments, which he thought were part of our empirical nature, is an example of such an 
empirical foundation.4 Kant argues explicitly against any such foundation in all three of his 
major ethical works: the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (G), the Critique of Practical 
Reason (CPrR), and the Metaphysics of Morals (MM). However, Kant gives some arguments 
against empirical foundations for morality in general and other arguments against specific types 
of empirical foundations for morality. So in order to best understand his arguments, I will first 
present Kant’s general arguments regarding empirical foundations and then use one of his 
arguments against a specific type of empirical foundation as an example. 
Kant thinks that moral laws must obligate all rational beings as such. As evident from the 
quotation included in the introduction above, he takes moral laws to be both universal and 
necessary.5 In MM, he says, “they hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to have an a 
priori basis and to be necessary. Indeed, concepts and judgments about ourselves and our deeds 
and omissions signify nothing moral if what they contain can be learned merely from 
experience” (6:215). If a law is based on empirical grounds, it cannot be a moral law.6 Empirical 
concepts are contingent and therefore unable to establish the necessity and universality that is 
required for moral laws. Continuing the introductory quotation, Kant says 
 
 
4  See David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn’s enlightening article in which they track the debate regarding the 
foundations of morality through 18th century British and German philosophy for examples of various foundations of 
morality, empirical and otherwise (Kuehn and Norton 2006, 949). See Stephen Darwall’s article for a similar but 
uniquely helpful account (Darwall, 2006). 
5 I am not here investigating why Kant thinks that moral laws must obligate all rational beings universally and 
necessarily. While this is an interesting and complicated topic, for the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to know 
that he thinks they must obligate all rational beings universally and necessarily.  
6 See Section 2 below for a detailed discussion of Kant’s definitions of practical principles and their sub-types, 
including moral laws.  
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Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e. as the ground of an 
obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that a command: thou shalt not lie does 
not just hold for human beings only, as if other rational beings did not have to heed it; 
and so with all remaining actual moral laws; hence that the ground of obligation here 
must not be sought in the nature of the human being, or in the circumstances of the world 
in which he is placed, but a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason. (4:389)  
 
Our reason for following a moral law cannot be anything empirical. Another way of putting this 
is that our motivation to act morally cannot be because we want to achieve some particular 
empirical object. For example, suppose that I desire to eat a particularly tasty-looking piece of 
cake that I spot across the room but an acquaintance of mine happens to be intently striding 
towards that piece of cake as well. In order to delay my acquaintance long enough to grab the 
cake for myself, I strike up a conversation with them in which I kindly listen to their recent 
struggles and offer helpful and appropriate advice that greatly consoles them. While striking up 
such a conversation may outwardly appear as if it is a moral action, my motivation all along was 
simply to eat the piece of cake for myself. But the piece of cake being there available to me was 
a contingent, empirical matter. Had it not been there, I would not have been motivated to have 
the reassuring conversation with my acquaintance. The fact that I was motivated to do the 
supposedly moral thing was contingent on my having a desire to eat cake and on there being 
cake nearby. This contingency is unacceptable according to Kant, and a moral system based on 
any empirical ground will have a similar problem. Kant is perhaps most explicit on this point 
later in G, where he says  
Empirical principles are not fit to be the foundation of moral laws at all. For the 
universality with which they are to hold for all rational beings regardless of differences – 
the unconditional practical necessity that is thereby imposed on them – vanishes if their 
ground is taken from the particular arrangement of human nature, or the contingent 
circumstance in which it is placed. (4:442)  
 
No empirical principle can produce moral laws, because moral laws require universality and 
necessity, but empirical principles cannot hold for all rational beings as such.  
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Happiness is the specific empirical foundation for morality that Kant argues against most 
often and most explicitly. Kant claims that “the concept of happiness is so indeterminate a 
concept that, even though every human being wishes to achieve it, yet he can never say 
determinately and in agreement with himself what he actually wishes and wants. The cause of 
this is: that the elements that belong to the concept of happiness are one and all empirical, i.e. 
must be borrowed from experience” (4:418). Kant had previously defined happiness as “the 
entire well-being and contentment with one’s condition” (4:393). So if we were to base a moral 
system on achieving happiness, morality would require all sorts of empirical things. Whether or 
not we are happy is a result of things that happen in experience. However, because empirical 
matters are contingent, we can never be certain that any given action will have the desired effect. 
You may quit your job because you think that another profession would make you happier only 
to find out that your original job was actually much better than your new job. Thus, there is no 
way to know for sure which actions will lead to happiness and which will not. Therefore, if 
morality is based on achieving happiness, there is no way to know for sure which actions are 
moral and which are not. Kant says that even the “most insightful and at the same time singularly 
able but still finite being…is not able to determine with complete certainty, according to any 
principle, what will make him truly happy, because omniscience would be required for this” 
(4:418). In the above example, I did not know for sure that starting the beneficial conversation 
with my acquaintance would allow me to secure the cake for myself. And further, I did not know 
for sure that securing the cake would make me happy. This inability to know with certainty what 
will make us happy is a result of the fact that happiness depends on empirical matters. 
Kant gives similar arguments against happiness as a foundation for morality in CPrR and 
MM as well. In CPrR, he says, “because cognition of [happiness] rests on sheer data of 
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experience,… it can indeed give general rules but never universal rules, that is, it can give rules 
that on the average are most often correct but not rules that must hold always and necessarily; 
hence no practical laws can be based on it” (5:36). Kant is again here emphasizing the fact that 
what makes us happy is an empirical contingency. Not only is it impossible to predict with 
certainty what will make each of us, ourselves, happy. It is impossible to predict with certainty 
what will make anyone else happy. There may be general rules of thumb that we can live by that 
are usually right. For instance, people generally require food in order to be happy. But because 
this is an empirical principle, it is not universally and necessarily true. So this rule by which we 
might try to increase our own happiness and that of others can never qualify as a moral law. Kant 
repeats this point in MM, saying, “only experience can teach what brings us joy. Only the natural 
drives for food, sex, rest, and movement, and (as our natural predispositions develop) for honor, 
for enlarging our cognition and so forth, can tell each of us and each only in his particular way, 
in what he will find those joys; and, in the same way, only experience can teach him the means 
by which to seek them” (6:215). According to Kant, what makes each of us happy is a 
thoroughly empirical and therefore contingent matter, thus “all apparently a priori reasoning 
about this comes down to nothing but experience raised by induction to generality” (6:216).  
Thus far, I have focused on one way in which Kant argues that empirical foundations of 
morality prevent morality from achieving the universality and necessity required for it. Because 
what makes each of us happy is empirically contingent, having happiness as our moral goal can 
produce no genuinely moral laws. However, Kant also gives another sort of argument for why 
empirical foundations of morality prevent morality from achieving universality and necessity. 
This other argument has to do with our incentive for acting morally. However, in order to fully 
understand this argument, it is important that we first understand the distinction between 
7 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Kant says that “imperatives are only formulae to 
express the relation of objective laws of willing as such to the subjective imperfection of the will 
of this or that rational being, e.g. of the human will” (4:414). In other words, we, as rational but 
finite beings, are presented with objective laws of willing but we do not already necessarily act 
according to those laws. We do not necessarily act according to those laws because we are also 
finite beings, subject to inclinations. Inclination is “the dependence of the desiderative faculty on 
sensations” (4:413). In addition to being presented with objective laws of willing, we are also 
presented with subjective incentives, incentives that apply to each of us as an individual, finite 
being. These two things that can factor into our choices of action, two potential determining 
grounds of the will, are often in tension with one another. We might know that in order to land a 
secure job, it is required that we spend copious amounts of time refining our application 
materials and searching for promising job offers and yet also feel the inclination to go on a 
vacation with our family where we do not spend any time doing those things. Imperatives are the 
form that objective laws of willing take for finite, rational beings like humans. Because it is 
possible for us to act not according to objective laws of willing, they take the form of an ought. 
In the above example, the imperative is: ‘if you wish to secure a job, you ought to spend a lot of 
time working on your applications and searching for jobs.  
Now, Kant says that “all imperatives command either hypothetically, or categorically” 
(4:414). Hypothetical imperatives, like the example from the last paragraph, are those that 
depend on us having a particular goal. The reason that I ought to spend a lot of time working on 
job applications and searching for jobs is because I do in fact wish to secure a job. If I did not 
wish to secure a job, I would no longer be necessitated to do that work. However, there are also 
categorical imperatives. Kant says, “the categorical imperative would be the one that represented 
8 
an action as objectively necessary by itself, without reference to another end” (4:414). 
Categorical imperatives do not require that we have any particular goal in order for them to apply 
to us. We are simply obligated to follow them no matter what goals we do or do not have. 
Because they depend on us having a particular goal in mind, hypothetical imperatives cannot 
obligate us universally and necessarily. The obligation to work on job applications does not 
apply to all rational beings as such. It only applies to those of us who wish to secure a job, and 
not all rational beings wish to secure a job. For this reason, hypothetical imperatives are not 
moral imperatives. Moral, categorical, imperatives must apply to all rational beings as such.  
Empirical foundations for morality cannot produce categorical imperatives, because they 
do not obligate rational beings as such. Kant says, “wherever an object of the will has to be made 
the foundation for prescribing the rule that determines it, there the rule is nothing other than 
heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely if or because one wills this object, one ought 
to act in such or such a way; hence it can never command morally, i.e. categorically” (4:444). 
For example, if happiness is the foundation for morality, our incentive to act morally relies on us 
wanting happiness. If we did not care about happiness, we would have no reason to pursue 
morality. Therefore, morality would be neither universal nor necessary.  
One might argue that all rational beings do in fact have happiness as their goal. 
Therefore, we can preserve the universality and necessity of morality, because all rational beings 
necessarily and universally aim at happiness. Kant himself says something like this: “to be happy 
is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being and therefore an unavoidable 
determining ground of its faculty of desire. For satisfaction with one’s whole existence is not, as 
it were, an original possession… but is instead a problem imposed upon him by his finite nature 
itself” (5:25). Because we are finite beings and have material needs, we necessarily have the 
9 
satisfaction of those needs (and our other desires) as our goal. While Kant does not say this here, 
it is worth pointing out that our aiming towards happiness is not a result of our rational nature. 
Rather, it is a result of our finite nature. It is implied that if there were an infinite, rational being, 
God, it would not necessarily have happiness as its goal. Thus, happiness is not the goal of all 
rational beings as such. Kant argues on other grounds. He says that “just because this material 
determining ground can be cognized only empirically by the subject, it is impossible to regard 
this problem as law, since a law, as objective, must contain the very same determining ground of 
the will in all cases and for all rational beings” (5:25). This is similar to his argument against 
happiness as the foundation for morality above. Happiness consists in different things for 
different rational beings, so if all rational beings followed the same principles, they would not all 
become happy. However, Kant takes his argument one step further and says, “suppose that finite 
rational beings were thoroughly agreed with respect to what they had to take as objects of their 
feelings of pleasure and pain and even with respect to the means that they must use to obtain the 
first and avoid the other; even then they could by no means pass off the principle of self-love [of 
which the principle of happiness is a type]7 as a practical law; for, this unanimity itself would 
still be only contingent” (5:26). In order for morality to be truly universal and necessary, it can 
have no empirical principles as its foundation. Even if all rational beings aim at those empirical 
principles in exactly the same way, the fact that they are universally aimed at is not a result of the 
rationality of those beings. Because they are empirical principles, even the universal consensus is 
itself contingent. All rational beings do not and cannot necessarily aim at happiness or any other 
empirical principle.  
 
7 See 5:22.  
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Kant’s attack on any empirical foundation for morality is focused most explicitly on 
happiness, but the most serious problems with happiness as a foundation for morality apply to all 
other empirical foundations for morality as well. Throughout his three major moral works, Kant 
condemns empirical foundations for morality for failing to establish the universality and 
necessity required for moral principles. He argues both that such principles cannot produce 
identical moral laws for all rational beings as such due to the indeterminacy of empirical 
principles as goals and that they rely on us having a contingent incentive for morality.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL INFLUENCE ON THE MORAL LAWS 
In what follows I will argue that despite Kant’s concern with empirical foundations for 
morality, what moral laws there are, according to Kant’s moral system, is partially determined by 
empirical information. Towards that end, I will introduce the major formulas of Kant’s supreme 
principle of morality before showing that they rely on empirical information in order to produce 
moral laws.8 I will then show why this result presents a problem for the consistency of Kant’s 
moral system. 
3.1 Formula of Universal Law 
When searching for the supreme principle of morality in G, Kant first identifies it as 
follows: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (4:421). This version of the supreme principle of morality has come to 
be known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). A version of this formula also appears in 
CPrR, where Kant says, “so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time 
as a principle in a giving of universal law” (5:30). Further, in the introduction to MM, Kant says 
 
8 I am indebted to Allen Wood’s, Kant’s Ethical Thought for helping organize my consideration of the different 
formulas of Kant’s supreme principle of morality (Wood 1999, 76-190).  
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that “the categorical imperative, which as such only affirms what obligation is, is: act upon a 
maxim that can also hold as a universal law” (6:225). So this version of Kant’s supreme principle 
of morality, FUL, can be found throughout Kant’s moral corpus, but still, it is not immediately 
clear how it is to be used for everyday moral reasoning.9 
In order to understand how we are to apply FUL, we must understand Kant’s definitions 
of the following terms: practical principles, maxims, and (practical) laws.10 Kant most helpfully 
defines these terms in CPrR, saying, “Practical principles are propositions that contain a general 
determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, 
when the condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will; but they are objective, 
or practical laws, when the condition is cognized as objective, that is, as holding for the will of 
every rational being” (5:19). ‘Practical principles’ is the most general term here. They contain a 
determination of the will, meaning that they contain a resolution regarding how to act. Further, 
that determination of the will is general, meaning that it is supposed to apply to multiple 
situations. Practical principles guide action across situations. Maxims and practical laws are both 
types of practical principles. Insofar as they are practical principles they contain “a general 
determination of the will” (5:19). The difference between maxims and laws hinges on who they 
are supposed to apply to. Maxims are subjective and are only taken to apply to the person willing 
them. Laws are objective and are taken to apply to all rational beings as such. One of Kant’s 
examples of a maxim is “to increase my wealth by every safe means” (5:27). This is a practical 
principle because it is action-guiding and because it applies across situations. The person who 
holds this maxim would increase their wealth whenever it is safe to do so. Further, it would be a 
 
9 I will not here be discussing a related but separate question as to whether Kant truly derives the supreme principle 
of morality a priori. For the purposes of this thesis, I am assuming that he does.  
10 In what follows I will be using the terms ‘practical laws’ and ‘moral laws’ interchangeably, as Kant seems to.  
12 
maxim if that person had only resolved that they would follow it, if they had not considered 
whether everyone ought to follow it. They just accept that for them it is good to increase their 
wealth by every safe means. Thus, it is a subjective practical principle, a maxim. Now imagine 
another person who is acting according to the principle that lying is forbidden. This is also a 
practical principle because it ranges across scenarios and it is action-guiding. However, we can 
imagine that this practical principle is taken to hold for all rational beings. The person acting 
according to it may think that lying is not just forbidden for them personally. Rather, lying is 
forbidden for all rational beings as such. Then, this practical principle is objective, a practical 
law.  
Returning to FUL as stated in G, Kant says, “act only according to that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (4:421). With a better 
understanding of what Kant means by maxim and law, it becomes apparent that FUL requires 
that we ask ourselves whether our maxims, the practical principles that we take to hold only for 
us, can also qualify as practical laws, the practical principles that hold for all rational beings. 
Further, it requires that we only act according to the practical principles that can qualify as 
practical laws. However, these requirements prompt the question: how are we supposed to tell 
whether our maxims also qualify as practical laws? 
In order for a practical principle to be a practical law, it must hold for all rational beings 
as such, that is, it must be objective. Kant says, “all practical principles that presuppose an object 
(matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception, 
empirical and can furnish no practical laws” (5:21). As explained above, if the motivation to act 
on a practical principle is contingent on it bringing about some material end, that principle 
13 
cannot be a practical law.11 To return to Kant’s example: if the reason that one is trying to 
increase their wealth by every safe means is so that they can purchase something, impress 
someone, achieve greater future security, or any other material goal, that principle cannot be a 
practical law because it cannot hold for all rational beings as such. Kant says, “a principle that is 
based only on the subjective condition of receptivity to a pleasure or displeasure (which can 
always be cognized only empirically and cannot be valid in the same way for all rational beings) 
can indeed serve as his maxim for the subject who possesses this receptivity but not as a law even 
for him (5:21-22) So any practical principle which is willed because the subject hopes to achieve 
some material end is a maxim and cannot qualify as a practical law.  
Given that all practical principles which rely on their matter as the determining ground of 
the will cannot be practical laws, Kant tries to establish what the determining ground of the will 
for any practical law would be. He says 
Now, all that remains of a law if one separates from it everything material, that is, every 
object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law. 
Therefore, either a rational being cannot think of his subjectively practical principles, that 
is, his maxims, as being at the same time universal laws or he must assume that their 
mere form, by which they are fit for a giving of universal law, of itself and alone makes 
them practical laws. (5:27)  
A practical principle’s form is its fittingness for being a universal law (5:74, 109, and 6:214). 
Thus, when we are investigating whether a practical principle can qualify as a universal law, we 
are investigating its form, not its matter, the thing we hope to accomplish by willing the practical 
principle. However, the question as to exactly how we investigate a practical principle’s form 
still remains.  
 
11 The ‘motivation to act’ here is another way of putting the ‘determining ground of the will.’ It is the thing for the 
sake of which we act. It must not be confused with a ‘determination of the will’ as referred to in the definition of 
practical principles above. A determination of the will is a resolution to act.  
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In CPrR, Kant describes a situation where he has a financial deposit in his possession, 
and the owner of that deposit has just died and left no record of it (5:27). As introduced above, 
Kant says that he has made it his maxim, “to increase my wealth by every safe means” (5:27). So 
Kant looks to apply FUL in order to determine whether it permits him to take the deposit for 
himself. FUL requires that Kant be able to will the maxim of his action to become a universal 
law. Kant shows us what this means by saying that he is considering “whether I could through 
my maxim at the same time give such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no 
one can prove has been made” (5:27). He is asking himself whether the subjective practical 
principle on which he is acting could also be objective and hold for all rational beings.  He is 
considering whether it would be possible to will the maxim of his action, when it has been 
universalized, that is, when everyone is acting on that maxim. Kant says, “I at once become 
aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that 
there are no deposits at all” (5:27). It would be impossible to will that the maxim be 
universalized, because the action would become impossible when universalized. Kant does not 
specify here exactly how the action would become impossible, but presumably, if everyone were 
denying deposits and stealing from one another at whatever chance they had, the practice of 
making deposits would fall out of existence. This action is not permissible because its maxim 
cannot be universalized. Thus, the practical principle quoted above does not qualify as a practical 
law, and according to FUL, it is impermissible to act on it. In order to tell what practical 
principles can qualify as practical laws, we must imagine a world in which everyone is acting 
according to that practical principle.  
In G, Kant enumerates two ways in which actions can fail to be permissible according to 
FUL. First, “some actions are such that their maxim cannot even be thought without 
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contradiction as a universal law of nature” (4:424). Further, some actions are not permissible 
according to FUL because they cannot be willed to become universal laws of nature. In other 
words, a will that willed that such a maxim become a universal law of nature would necessarily 
contradict itself, even though it is possible to conceive that such a maxim could be a universal 
law of nature. I take Kant’s deposit example from CPrR to be an example of the first type. 
According to Kant, it is impossible to conceive of deposits continuing to exist when they are 
being universally denied at every opportunity. Now that I have laid out both the underpinnings 
and the concrete application of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, I will analyze two of Kant’s 
examples in order to show that whether a practical principle is a practical law or not is partially 
determined by empirical information.  
In G, Kant gives four examples to help illustrate how to apply FUL. For all of these 
examples, empirical information partially determines whether the given practical principle 
qualifies as a practical law. However, for brevity’s sake, I will focus on two of these examples. 
First, Kant considers suicide. The practical principle in question is: “from self-love I make it my 
principle to shorten my life if, when protracted any longer, it threatens more ill than it promises 
agreeableness” (4:422). Kant argues that such a practical principle is not permissible according 
to FUL because it is incoherent when universalized. He says, “a nature whose law it were to 
destroy life itself by means of the same sensation the function of which it is to impel towards the 
advancement of life, would contradict itself and would thus not subsist as a nature (4:422). The 
reason that one would be committing suicide is to avoid unnecessary suffering. In this case, 
humans’ natural tendency towards self-love would motivate suicide. But self-love is generally 
motivated towards the advancement of life. So, were we to pose the practical principle of suicide 
as a universal law of nature, self-love would require us to commit suicide and require us to 
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advance our lives. This is incoherent, and thus, the practical principle is not universalizable. 
Therefore, it is impermissible to act according to the practical principle given above, according 
to FUL.  
In G, Kant does not explain the concept of self-love beyond saying that it is impels us 
“towards the advancement of life” (4:422). However, in other texts, Kant confirms that self-love 
is an empirical concept. The empirical nature of self-love is most evident in CPrR, where Kant 
calls self-love a “predominant benevolence toward oneself” and says that “pure practical reason 
merely infringes upon self-love, inasmuch as it only restricts it, as natural and active in us even 
prior to the moral law, to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational 
self-love (5:73).12 By distinguishing rational self-love from ordinary self-love, Kant shows that 
self-love is ordinarily non-rational in its origin. It is a feature of our nature as empirical beings. 
Because Kant’s argument for the impermissibility of suicide depends on self-love (1) being an 
inclination that human beings actually have and (2) having certain features, the impermissibility 
of suicide rests on empirical facts about us. Were those facts different, suicide could be 
permissible according to FUL. Therefore, the fact that the given practical principle does not 
qualify as a practical law is partially determined by the empirical facts that humans have self-
love and that it has certain features.  
In Kant’s suicide example, the practical principle of suicide does not cohere with FUL 
because it is incoherent when universalized. The next example is of a practical principle that 
does not cohere with FUL because it cannot be willed to be a universal law. It is the neglect of 
one’s natural talents. Kant describes someone who has natural talents that, were they to be 
cultivated, “could make him a useful human being in all sorts of respects” (4:423). However, this 
 
12 See also 5:22. 
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person would rather not exert the effort to cultivate those talents and prefers laziness. The 
question is: “whether his maxim of neglecting his natural gifts…agrees with what one calls duty” 
(4:423). Kant argues that such a maxim is coherent as a universal law. Humans could continue to 
exist even if everyone acted on such a maxim. However, the lazy person, “cannot possibly will 
that this become a universal law of nature, or as such be placed in us by natural instinct. For as a 
rational being he necessarily wills that all capacities in him be developed, because they serve him 
and are given to him for all sorts of purposes” (4:423). The practical principle is not 
universalizable because it conflicts with something that Kant thinks all rational beings 
necessarily will. Therefore, it is impermissible to neglect the development of one’s natural 
talents according to FUL.  
This example is more curious than the previous one. Kant claims that laziness in regard to 
developing one’s talents is at odds with the fact that all rational beings necessarily will that their 
talents be developed. If this really is the case, then the fact that laziness in regard to one’s natural 
talents is impermissible according to FUL does not depend on empirical information. It can be 
derived a priori just from the concept of a rational being. However, Kant does not provide an a 
priori argument for his claim that rational beings necessarily behave this way. In fact, if it really 
is the case that all rational beings necessarily will that their talents be developed, it seems strange 
that Kant is even positing a rational being who is contemplating not doing so. Without a priori 
proof that rational beings necessarily will that their capacities be developed it is difficult to 
assume that Kant is not relying on empirical information here too. So while it is not clear that the 
evaluation of this practical principle definitely does require empirical information, it is also not 
clear that the evaluation definitely does not require empirical information. 
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 I have shown that in order for FUL to determine whether or not a practical principle 
qualifies as a universal law it must rely on some empirical information. As I laid out above, Kant 
thinks that the form of a practical principle is its fittingness for practical law. So insofar as 
empirical information determines whether or not a practical principle is fit for being a practical 
law, and I have argued that it does, empirical information determines what sort of form that 
practical principle has. However, as I will elaborate on in section 4, even if it is true that a 
practical principle’s form is determined by empirical information, that does not mean that all 
practical principles are maxims, according to Kant’s definition, but it does complicate Kant’s 
picture of practical laws as universal and necessary. What practical laws there are, what practical 
principles qualify as practical laws, depends on empirical information, which is contingent. If 
that empirical information were different, it could affect whether a given practical principle 
qualifies as a practical law. Thus, contrary to what Kant claims, moral laws are neither universal 
nor necessary according to FUL. 
3.2 Formula of Humanity 
I have established that for FUL, the first formula of Kant’s supreme principle of morality 
from G, whether a practical principle is a moral law or not depends on empirical information. 
But it is possible that Kant’s other formulas of the supreme principle of morality may avoid such 
a problem. In order to show that this is not the case, let us consider the next major formula of the 
supreme principle of morality from G, the Formula of Humanity (FH). This formula is as 
follows: “so act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (4:429). FH is different from FUL 
in several important ways. In order to make these differences clearer, let us look to Kant’s 
discussion of having ends as duties in MM.  
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FUL outlaws or permits given practical principles. FH is supposed to allow us to know 
what practical principles we should have. More specifically, Kant is concerned with knowing 
what ends we should have. If all ends, as the things we mean to accomplish through our will, 
only had value because we desired them, then categorical imperatives would be impossible. All 
imperatives would be hypothetical, because they would only be imperatives insofar as we take 
those particular ends as our own. “But suppose there were something the existence of which in 
itself has an absolute worth, that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws, then 
the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i.e. of a practical law, would lie in it, and only in 
it alone” (4:428). In order to ground a categorical imperative, there needs to be something that 
has absolute worth all on its own. Kant says, “a human being and generally every rational being 
exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means for discretionary use for this or that will, but 
must in all its actions, whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be 
considered at the same time as an end” (4:428). For the purposes of this paper, it is not crucially 
important that we understand exactly why humanity (as rationality) qualifies as an end in itself.13 
Rather, what is most important for our purposes is that Kant presents FH as a result of this 
realization. Because humanity has absolute worth, we all have a duty to take humanity as an end 
in our willing.14  
In order to demonstrate this fresh formula of the supreme principle of morality, Kant sets 
out to apply it to the same four examples he used to demonstrate FUL. So in order to show that 
 
13 See Wood’s Kant’s Ethical Thought for an incisive explanation of exactly why humanity has absolute worth for 
Kant and how this leads Kant to FH (Wood 1999, 111-132). 
14 One might argue that Kant’s argument for humanity as an end in itself is actually empirically based, in which case 
FH fails to get off the ground as a way of determining morality universally and necessarily. While this is a legitimate 
concern, I will not be discussing it here. Similar to the above, where I took Kant’s argument for FUL to be a priori 
and legitimate, I will be accepting Kant’s argument for humanity as an end in itself as a priori as well. My 
contention is that even accepting this, according to FH, what moral laws there are is still determined by empirical 
information.  
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this new formula also depends on empirical information, I will consider those examples myself. 
Similar to my treatment of FUL, for brevity’s sake, I will only consider two of those four 
examples here, but it will be the two that I did not consider above.  
Kant argues that FH can explain why lying is wrong. In G, he says that “someone who 
has it in mind to make a lying promise to others will see at once that he wants to make use of 
another human being merely as a means, who does not at the same time contain in himself the 
end” (4:429). He then argues that it would be impossible for the victim of the lie to consent to 
such treatment. Thus, they cannot share the ends of the liar’s actions, meaning that the liar is 
treating them merely as a means. Kant’s argument against lying in MM is more comprehensive. 
First, he says, “by a lie a human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a 
human being” (6:429). So it is not just that the liar disrespects the humanity of the person they lie 
to. They disrespect their own humanity as well. Presumably, this is because 
Communication of one’s thoughts to someone through words that yet (intentionally) 
contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly 
opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to communicate his 
thoughts, and is thus a renunciation by the speaker of his personality, and such a speaker 
is a mere deceptive appearance of a human being, not a human being himself. (6:429) 
Humans have a capacity to communicate their thoughts to one another, and the natural purpose 
of that capacity is to accurately convey what they are thinking. Lying to someone else precludes 
the liar from achieving that natural purpose, because they are not actually communicating what 
they are thinking. So by deceiving his interlocutor, the liar is not only disrespecting the humanity 
of the interlocutor by treating him merely as a means. The liar is also disrespecting his own 
humanity by preventing himself from realizing the natural purpose of his capacity for 
communication.   
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Kant’s belief that humans have a “natural purposiveness” to communicate our thoughts 
relies on humans having the capacity to communicate (6:429). If we were not able to 
communicate, we would not have this purposiveness, and in turn, lying would not disrespect our 
humanity. However, Kant does not argue that our capacity to communicate is a result of our 
rational nature as such, and there is reason to doubt that it is. If our capacity to communicate 
were a result of our rational nature as such, all rational beings would have such a capacity. But 
we can imagine (and perhaps observe) individual human beings who are rational but are unable 
to communicate their thoughts. For example, someone who is completely paralyzed may have a 
vivid, ordered inner life involving the reasoned consideration of their environment and yet find 
themselves unable to indicate their thoughts to any other person. Or for another example, a 
completely isolated individual could live rationally and yet have no other rational being available 
to them with whom they can communicate their thoughts. So the capacity to communicate is a 
contingent fact of humans’ empirical nature, not solely our rational nature. And because Kant’s 
argument for the impermissibility of lying depends on humans having the capacity to 
communicate, it depends on some empirical information. According to FH, lying is wrong 
because it treats humanity merely as a means, but in a different empirical world, even with 
rational beings, that could be different. Thus, the fact that lying is wrong according to FH is 
determined by empirical information.   
In regard to being indifferent to the needs of others, Kant says, “humanity could indeed 
subsist if no one contributed anything to the happiness of others while not intentionally 
detracting anything from it; but this is still only a negative and not positive agreement with 
humanity, as an end in itself, if everyone does not also try, as far as he can, to advance the ends 
of others” (4:430). The problem with indifference is not that it actively disrespects humanity as 
22 
an end in itself. Rather, it passively fails to respect humanity as an end in itself. Kant’s argument 
against such indifference in MM is not particularly helpful here, because it only considers the 
action in terms of FUL (6:452-453). But an argument in terms of FH could be given as well. By 
being indifferent to the needs of others, one is directly failing to place humanity as one’s end. 
Insofar as others are human, we should treat them as an end. It is not enough to simply avoid 
treating them as mere means; we should take their happiness as our end. 
This argument also depends on empirical information. Namely, it depends on 
indifference being on-the-whole worse for those we would have helped. But imagine an 
empirically different scenario. Imagine that we are very inept at helping others. Were it the case 
that our help was predictably ineffective and actually harmful, it seems like we would no longer 
be treating humanity as an end in itself. By continuing to try to help, we would be harming. In 
such a scenario, indifference would actually be required in order to properly respect humanity. 
What determines whether or not being indifferent to the needs of others actually disrespects their 
humanity depends on whether or not it would be better to try to help them. But this is an 
empirical matter. Thus, the immorality of indifference to the needs of others according to FH 
depends on empirical information.  
Kant’s application of FH in his four examples from G, and their corollary arguments in 
MM, depends on empirical information in order to determine the morality or immorality of 
actions. But this problem is not limited to his particular examples. Rather, it is a result of FH 
itself. As Allen Wood notes, “we may regard every argument from FH to a general duty as 
resting on an intermediate premise, logically independent of FH itself, which tells us what a kind 
of action (or its maxim) expresses or fails to express concerning the worth of humanity” (152). In 
each of the above examples, an intermediate premise stating, for example, ‘lying disrespects 
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humanity’ was required to get from FH to the conclusion that lying is wrong. In the above 
passages, I have argued that in two of Kant’s examples, that intermediate premise is determined 
by empirical information. Whether or not the action respects humanity is dependent on empirical 
information. The intermediate premise will always involve some action itself and an explanation 
for why that action does or does not respect humanity. However, those explanations will rely on 
the empirical circumstances relevant to the case. So any decision issued by FH will be influenced 
by the empirical information imbued in its intermediate premise.15  
Thus, whether we use FUL or FH to determine what moral laws there are, the outcome 
will be partially determined by empirical information. Further, because empirical information is 
contingent, what moral laws there are is also contingent. This result is at odds with Kant’s 
insistence that moral laws be both universal and necessary. However, it remains to be seen 
whether Kant’s argument against empirical foundations for morality from section 2 can solve the 
problem that I have presented in section 3. 
 
4 Can Kant Avoid this Problem? 
To recap, Kant’s main argument against any empirical foundation for morality as laid out 
above revolved around two claims: (1) the realization of empirical goals is empirically 
contingent, and (2) material ends cannot be the incentive to moral action. Neither of these claims 
solve the problem from section 2, because in order to solve that problem Kant would need to 
explain how what the moral laws are is not determined by empirical information. His argument 
 
15 As this thesis is focused on showing that Kant’s moral system does not establish the universality and necessity of 
moral laws, and as noted by Wood, Kant’s Formula of the Realm of Ends (FRE) is not used to establish particular 
moral laws in Kant’s major moral works, I will not be discussing it at length here (Wood: 1999, 167). It is worth 
noting however, that the idea that all moral actions must cohere together, which is the impetus behind FRE, requires 
that no two moral actions contradict one another. This coherence is only ensured if moral laws are not contingent, 
which I have argued Kant’s system does not establish.  
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against an empirical foundation for morality does not do this, because it instead focuses on the 
problems associated with having empirical goals for morality. Kant thought that the form of a 
practical principle was not empirical and thus that it would be both universal and necessary. 
However, I have shown that the form of a practical principle, its fittingness for being a practical 
law, is in fact determined by empirical information. However, this does not mean that when we 
act morally according to Kant’s system, we are really acting for the sake of some material end. 
Rather, even if the form of a practical principle is empirically determined, we are still judging 
practical principles based on that form and not on their matter. So there is still a significant 
distinction between Kant’s moral system and the ones that he argues against.  
However, the deeper motivation behind Kant’s critique of empirical foundations for 
morality was that they failed to establish the universality and necessity of moral laws. These laws 
are supposed to obligate all rational beings and be the same for all rational beings. But according 
to my argument above, Kant’s own moral system also fails in this regard. So while the problem 
from section 2 is not the same problem that Kant argues against in section 1, it has a similar 
result. What moral laws there are is a matter of empirical contingency.16  
    
Kant’s argument against an empirical foundation for morality focuses most heavily on the 
fact that the determining ground of the will for a moral action cannot be the material end that we 
hope to achieve by that action. In my view, Kant successfully argues against such foundations on 
the grounds that they do not provide for the universality and necessity of moral laws that is 
 
16 Although, there may still be reason to prefer Kant’s system to that of his targets. Kant’s system does not base 
morality on anything empirical directly. He would have us ask ourselves if, to the best of our knowledge, the 
principles on which we act could be taken up by all rational beings. The answer to that question may be empirically 
determined, but Kant’s system does a better job of approximating universality than his opponents’ empirical moral 
theories. 
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required by morality. However, this argument does not address a problem with the role that 
empirical information plays in Kant’s own moral system which leads to the same result. What 
moral laws there are is partially empirically determined, and thus, Kant’s own moral laws are 
neither universal nor necessary. It is unclear from his main argument against empirical 
foundations of morality how Kant would respond to this charge.  
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